Brazil’s Early 2022 Exit Fueled Nine Positional Changes for 2026

When Croatia eliminated Brazil on penalties in the 2022 World Cup quarterfinals, the result was a profound disappointment. Brazil had entered the tournament as the favorite, boasting a deep squad and a group-stage record of three wins. Yet they managed only five matches before heading home. The defeat exposed structural flaws that had been masked by individual brilliance. By early 2023, the coaching staff and federation initiated a positional overhaul that has reshaped nearly every line of the team. As of late 2024, nine of the eleven starters from that Croatia match have been replaced or repositioned. Only goalkeeper Alisson, center-back Marquinhos, and defensive midfielder Casemiro remain in the current first-choice eleven, and even their roles have evolved. The nine swaps, the reasoning behind them, and what they mean for Brazil’s 2026 campaign are detailed below.

The Quarterfinal Shock That Rewired Brazil’s Thinking

Brazil’s 2022 campaign ended in familiar disappointment. Neymar scored a stunning extra-time goal to put Brazil ahead, but Croatia equalized through Bruno Petkovic in the 117th minute. The penalty shootout that followed was decisive: Rodrygo and Marquinhos missed, and Brazil exited. It was the fifth consecutive World Cup in which Brazil failed to reach the semifinals since winning the title in 2002.

Manager Tite resigned immediately after the match, acknowledging that the team had underperformed relative to its talent. The defeat was not a fluke. Brazil had averaged 68% possession against Croatia but generated only 1.2 xG, largely from low-probability shots. In the knockout phase as a whole, Brazil scored just one goal from open play after the 80th minute—Neymar’s equalizer against Croatia—and relied heavily on individual moments rather than systemic creation.

Analysis within the Brazilian Football Confederation highlighted tactical stagnation. Brazil’s build-up was predictable, their pressing triggers were too deep, and their set-piece output was the worst among the top eight teams in Qatar. According to data from Opta, Brazil’s set-piece xG per game fell to 0.08, compared to 0.18 for eventual champions Argentina. The federation concluded that continuity alone would not close the gap.

By early 2023, a new direction had been set. Interim coach Ramon Menezes oversaw a transitional period, and then Dorival Júnior was appointed permanently in July 2023. Dorival, who had won the Copa Libertadores with Flamengo in 2022, was tasked with modernizing the team’s approach while preserving its attacking identity. Since then, personnel changes have reflected a deeper tactical shift.

Nine Personnel Swaps in the Starting XI

Comparing the starting lineup from the Croatia match to the team that lined up for the 2026 qualifiers in late 2024 reveals a near-total transformation. Only Alisson, Marquinhos, and Casemiro remain from the 2022 defeat. The other eight positions have changed, and a ninth—the right-back spot—has effectively changed even if the same player (Danilo) occupies it, because Danilo now plays a different role in possession.

In goal, Alisson retains his place, though his distribution has been asked to be quicker and more vertical. Marquinhos remains the senior center-back, but his partner has shifted from Thiago Silva (who retired from international football) to a rotation of younger defenders such as Gabriel Magalhães and Bremer. Casemiro still anchors the midfield, but his defensive responsibilities are now shared more evenly with his midfield partners.

Attack has seen the most notable changes. Vinicius Júnior, who came off the bench against Croatia, is now the focal point of the attack. He leads the team in dribbles per game (4.7 as of late 2024) and has become the primary creator from the left wing. Rodrygo has replaced Raphinha on the right, offering more directness and a higher work rate in defensive transitions. Up front, Richarlison has been displaced by a rotating cast including Gabriel Jesus, Pedro, and even the younger Endrick, who made his senior debut in 2023.

At full-back, Danilo (now at Juventus) and Renan Lodi have replaced the older Danilo (formerly of Juventus but now at Flamengo) and Alex Sandro. The new full-backs are asked to push higher and invert into midfield more often, a change that has increased Brazil’s passing options in central areas. The cumulative effect of these swaps is a team that is younger, quicker in transition, and more tactically flexible than its 2022 predecessor.

The New Midfield Engine: Paquetá and Guimarães

Brazil’s midfield in 2022 was built around Casemiro’s defensive cover and Neymar’s creative freedom. Between them, there was often a gap. Paquetá and Guimarães were both used in Qatar but not as a consistent double pivot. Since Dorival’s appointment, the midfield has been redesigned to provide more progressive passing and better pressing coverage.

Lucas Paquetá has seen his xG per 90 rise from 0.12 in 2022 to 0.21 in the current qualifying cycle, reflecting his increased license to arrive late in the box. He is completing 92% of his passes under pressure, a statistic that underscores his reliability in tight spaces. Bruno Guimarães, now a starter, averages 2.3 key passes per 90 and has become the primary link between defense and attack. His ability to receive the ball on the half-turn and play forward quickly has reduced Brazil’s reliance on Casemiro for vertical passes.

The introduction of André, a deep-lying playmaker from Fluminense, has added another dimension. André’s pass completion rate of 94% in qualifying matches is the highest among Brazil’s midfielders, and he often drops between the center-backs to initiate build-up. This allows Casemiro to push higher and engage in pressing, rather than sitting deep. The average age of Brazil’s midfield three has dropped from 31 in 2022 to 25 in the current cycle.

Opponents have struggled to adjust. In the 2026 qualifiers, Brazil’s midfield has won the second-ball battle in six of eight matches, compared to just four of five in the 2022 tournament. The increased energy levels have also contributed to a higher turnover rate in the opponent’s half, which has led to more transition opportunities for Vinicius Júnior and Rodrygo. However, the new midfield is still learning to manage games when trailing, a scenario that did not occur often in qualifying but will be critical in the knockout stage.

Neymar’s Diminished Role and the Post-2023 Plan

Neymar’s place in the team has become one of the most debated topics in Brazilian football. Since the 2022 World Cup, he has missed 18 of 24 qualifier matches due to injury and a controversial move to Al-Hilal in the Saudi Pro League. His minutes per goal for the national team have fallen to 134, a significant decline from his prime years. Meanwhile, Vinicius Júnior has taken over as the team’s primary dribbler and chance creator.

Dorival Júnior has made it clear that he will not build the team around a fixed number 10. In the 2024 qualifiers, Brazil has used a 4-3-3 formation with a fluid front three, rather than a dedicated playmaker. Neymar, when fit, has been deployed as a left-sided forward or as a second striker, but the system no longer revolves around him. Only three of Brazil’s nine qualifier goals in 2024 came from Neymar assists, compared to seven from Vinicius Júnior and Rodrygo combined.

The federation’s long-term plan appears to be a gradual reduction of Neymar’s influence. He will turn 34 during the 2026 World Cup, and his injury record suggests he cannot be relied upon to start seven matches in a month. The team is being built to function without him, with Vinicius Júnior, Rodrygo, and the emerging Endrick forming a younger attacking core. This shift has not been without controversy—many Brazilian fans and pundits still view Neymar as the team’s most talented player—but the data supports the change.

However, the transition carries risk. Neymar’s absence in high-pressure moments has been felt in matches where Brazil struggled to break down compact defenses. In a 1-0 qualifying win over Ecuador, Brazil created only 0.8 xG in the second half, and the lack of a creative midfielder was evident. Dorival has experimented with using Paquetá in a more advanced role, but the team’s chance creation in tight games remains a concern. The 2026 cycle will test whether Brazil can win without its talisman.

Defensive Overhaul: Full-Backs and Pressing Triggers

Brazil’s defense in 2022 was solid but not progressive. The full-backs, Danilo and Alex Sandro, were both in their thirties and rarely ventured beyond the halfway line. The center-backs, Thiago Silva and Marquinhos, were excellent on the ball but slow to recover when the high press was bypassed. The result was a team that kept clean sheets against weaker opponents but conceded soft goals in key moments.

The overhaul began with the full-back positions. Danilo (now at Juventus) and Renan Lodi are younger and more athletic. They average 2.1 more recoveries per 90 than their predecessors, and they initiate the press higher up the pitch. Dorival has set the pressing trigger at the opponent’s 45-yard line, meaning the full-barks step up to engage when the ball enters that zone. This has reduced the time opponents have to pick out passes, but it also leaves space behind if the press is broken.

Center-backs have been asked to step into midfield more often, particularly when Brazil builds from the back. Marquinhos now averages 12.4 passes into the final third per 90, up from 8.7 in 2022. His partner, whether Gabriel Magalhães or Bremer, is tasked with covering the space vacated by the advancing full-back. This aggressive defensive shape has improved Brazil’s clean-sheet rate in qualifiers from 40% to 56% as of late 2024.

Yet the approach has vulnerabilities. Against fast counter-attacking teams like Colombia and Uruguay, Brazil’s high line has been breached. In a 2-2 draw with Colombia in 2023, Brazil conceded twice on transitions after losing possession in midfield. The trade-off between pressing intensity and defensive solidity remains unresolved. Dorival has acknowledged that the team is still learning to manage the balance, and some analysts argue that Brazil’s defensive structure is not yet reliable enough for a knockout tournament.

Why the 2022 Exit Exposed a Tactical Plateau

The 2022 defeat was not an isolated incident but the culmination of a decade of underperformance. Brazil’s tactical approach had plateaued. They dominated possession but struggled to convert it into high-quality chances. Against Croatia, Brazil had 68% possession but managed only 1.2 xG, with most shots coming from outside the box. Opponents blocked 42% of Brazil’s shots in the tournament, the highest rate among the top eight teams.

Transition speed was another weakness. Brazil ranked 14th out of 32 teams in transition speed, defined as the average time taken to move the ball from defensive to attacking third. This allowed opponents to reset their defensive shape. The team’s set-piece output was the worst among the top eight, with an xG per game of 0.08. Compare that to Argentina’s 0.18, and the gap in tactical preparation becomes clear.

Individual brilliance masked these issues in the group stage, where Brazil beat Serbia, Switzerland, and Cameroon without conceding. But in the knockout rounds, systemic weaknesses are exposed. The 2022 team lacked a plan B when the first-choice approach failed. Tite’s substitutions were often reactive rather than proactive, and the team’s shape became disjointed in extra time against Croatia.

The current cycle is an attempt to address these flaws. Dorival has emphasized quicker transitions, more varied attacking patterns, and a higher pressing line. The early results in qualifiers are promising, but the real test will come in the 2024 Copa América and the 2026 World Cup itself. As Germany’s 2026 Youth Core Outperforms Their 2018 Tournament Average shows, other nations are also evolving. Brazil cannot afford to stand still.

What the 2026 Cycle Demands from Dorival’s Brazil

Consolidating a starting XI by March 2025 is the first priority. The current rotation has been useful for testing players, but a stable lineup builds chemistry. Dorival has used 28 different players in qualifiers, and only Alisson, Marquinhos, Casemiro, and Vinicius Júnior have started more than five matches. The midfield partnership of Paquetá, Guimarães, and André looks promising, but it has only started three games together.

Improving set-piece output is another clear target. Brazil’s set-piece xG per game has risen to 0.12 in the current cycle, still below the top teams but better than 2022. Dedicated set-piece coaches have been brought in, and routines are being practiced more thoroughly. The 2026 World Cup will likely be decided by fine margins, and set pieces could be the difference.

Developing a secondary scorer beyond Vinicius Júnior is critical. As of late 2024, Vinicius has scored or assisted 60% of Brazil’s goals in qualifiers. If he is injured or marked out of a game, the team needs alternatives. Rodrygo has shown flashes but is still inconsistent. Endrick, at 18, is a long-term prospect but may not be ready for the 2026 tournament. The federation hopes that a full season of European competition for these players will sharpen their finishing.

Maintaining the midfield press without sacrificing defensive shape is perhaps the hardest task. Brazil’s high press has been effective in qualifiers, but it has also led to counter-attacking goals. The team must learn to recognize when to press and when to drop into a mid-block. This decision-making comes with experience, and the young midfield will need to mature quickly. Winning the 2024 Copa América would build momentum and confidence, but it is not a guarantee of World Cup success. As Argentina’s second-half pressing drop shows, even the best teams have vulnerabilities. Brazil’s journey from the Qatar disappointment to a potential 2026 triumph is still a work in progress.